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I. INTRODUCTION 
Indicators of the sustainability of fiscal policies play an important role in the conduct 
of the international surveillance of fiscal policies. The construction of these 
indicators, however, is beset with serious problems. To illustrate, many authors have 
observed that conventional measures of public debt are potentially misleading 
indicators of public wealth and the effects of fiscal policy on the intergenerational 
distribution of resources (see, for example, Blejer and Cheasty (1 99 1 ) and Blanchard 
et al. (1990)). In particular, policies that do not directly result in an increase in public 
debt may yield similar effects to the accumulation of public debt in that they impose 
long-term budgetary costs and require an increase in tax rates or a cut in spending 
in the future. Examples of these policies include selling public assets, reducing 
public investments and public loans, and introducing unfunded public pensions. 
Indicators of fiscal sustainability should measure the long-run costs of these policies 
in order to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies that erode the stock of public wealth. 
Most studies that attempt to construct internationally comparable indicators of 
fiscal sustainability focus on forecasting government spending. The OECD and the 
IMF, for example, have examined how ageing would affect spending on social 
security pensions and health care into the next century (see, for example, Heller, 
Hemming and Konhert (1986) and Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989)). In this paper 
we focus on two issues that the literature on fiscal sustainability has largely ignored. 
The first issue concerns the way governments finance social security old-age 
pensions and the pensions of their own employees (Section 11). The second issue 
involves the relationship between, on the one hand, supplementary pension saving 
and, on the other hand, future revenues from the personal income tax (Section 111). 
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In particular, the present tax treatment of supplementary pensions and life assurance 
implies that countries with substantial savings in pension and life assurance funds 
can anticipate a broader base of the personal income tax compared with countries 
with less pension savings. Section IV explores two alternative tax treatments of 
pension saving with different implications for public debt. 
11. SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS OF PUBLIC SERVANTS 
Governments differ in how they make provisions for their explicit or implicit 
obligations associated with social security old-age pensions and the supplementary 
pensions of their employees. Many governments finance these pensions out of 
current revenues on a pay-as-you-go basis. Others, in contrast, accumulate capital 
to provide for these pensions. In particular, Sweden, Japan and Canada effectively 
pre-fund part of their social security old-age pensions. These countries have 
accumulated substantial funds in their public pension plans; in 1989 social security 
reserves amounted to 30 per cent of GDP in Sweden, 18 per cent of GDP in Japan 
and 8 per cent of GDP in Canada (see, for example, Munnell and Ernsberger (1989)). 
Although in Japan the pay-as-you-go component has gained importance in recent 
years, capital has continued to accumulate in the social security funds. Also the 
United States is currently building up significant reserves in its social security trust 
fund in order to ease the future burden of public pension benefits. 
As regards the supplementary pensions of public employees, the Dutch 
Government contracts out almost all its obligations to the public sector pension fund 
(Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds (ABP)), which fully funds the pensions of the 
employees in the public sector. Also the Swiss Government and local authorities in 
the United States and the United Kingdom fund the pensions of their employees. 
In principle, the unfunded explicit or implicit pension liabilities of the various 
governments should be added to the stocks of public debt to arrive at a better measure 
for the liabilities of the public sector.' Unfortunately, measures for the unfunded 
pension liabilities of the various governments are difficult to come by. Lacking this 
information, we adopt a 'second-best' procedure. In particular, we make the 
international data on public debt more comparable by subtracting from public debt 
the assets in both social security trust funds and the pension funds for public 
employees (Table 1). An international comparison of this nature fails to capture 
international differences in future pension liabilities (as a percentage of GDP). 
Hence, it overstates the relative wealth position of governments that feature large 
(implicit or explicit) pension commitments to their employees. 
' Future pension benefits are not contractual obligations in the same way as regular debt instruments are and feature 
distinct riskcharacteristics. Hence, these two types of liability are not perfectly substitutable (see also Section IV). 
One can therefore argue that, rather than adding the pension liabilities to their regular debt, governments should 
provide supplemental information regarding the potential future liabilities on account of the pensions payments to 
their own employees and social security old-age pensions. 
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United States 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Netherlands 
France 
TABLE I 
Pension Social security Gross Public debt 
funds of funds public adjusted for 
public debP public pension 
employees schemes 
1 7b 3 54 34 
1 2b  18 69 39 
18 0 39 21 
34 0 81 47 
0 0 43 43 
0 0 47 47 
Public Debt and Assets in Funded Pension Schemes of the Government Sector 
in Selected OECD Countries, 1989 
a As defined in OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1990. 
Source: US: Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), Issue Brief, July 1988 and Social Security 
Bulletin, July 1990; Japan: Insurance News; UK: PDFM, Pension Fund Indicators, May 1990; 
Netherlands: van Loo, 1990. 
Estimate based on the growth of the assets from previous years. 
The correction for the funding of public pension commitments causes public debt 
in Japan and the United States to fall below that in France and Germany. The adjusted 
level of public debt in the Netherlands falls to a level comparable to that in France 
and Germany. However, this information should not necessarily be interpreted as 
indicating that the public finances in these countries are in order. Not only data on 
public debt, but also the dynamics of the financial deficit of the public sector, can 
reveal important information about the health of the public finances. In particular, 
governments that fund the pensions of their employees can achieve short-term 
budgetary gains at the expense of higher long-run budgetary costs by reducing 
contributions to the pension schemes of public employees. In the Netherlands, for 
example, a substantial part of the decline of the public sector deficit in recent years 
has been achieved through a reduction in the financial surplus (i.e. the difference 
between receipts of the pension fund - the sum of capital income from capital assets 
and collected pension contributions - and benefits paid out) of the pension scheme 
for public employees. 
111. TAX CLAIMS ON FUNDED PENSION AND LIFE ASSURANCE SCHEMES 
Another important aspect of the international comparability of public debt data 
concerns the interaction between the tax treatment of supplementary pensions and 
the size of funded pension and life assurance schemes. 
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1 .  Tax Treatment of Supplementary Pensions 
In most countries, supplementary pensions are taxed on a consumption-tax basis2 
by allowing pension premiums to be deducted from the income tax liability while 
subjecting the pension benefit to tax. The provisions of the OECD Model Tax Treaty 
that deal with the tax treatment of the benefits from private pension schemes are 
consistent with this tax treatment. According to these provisions, the country where 
a retiree resides should collect income tax on pension benefits. This ‘cash-flow’ 
treatment implies that taxes are deferred until retirement. An alternative version of 
the consumption tax is the so-called ‘prepayment method’. According to this 
method, premiums are not tax-deductible - but neither the returns on the pension 
assets nor the pension benefits are included in the tax net. In essence, consumption 
taxes are ‘prepaid’ during the working life. The two distinct tax systems could be 
interpreted as implying two distinct tax bases. Under the prepayment system, labour 
income is the tax base. If benefits are consumed, consumption constitutes the base 
for the cash-flow tax. 
The two alternative tax systems may affect the timing of tax collection. In a 
pay-as-you-go pension system, pension saving is zero and premiums always equal 
benefits. Accordingly, the two versions of the consumption tax yield the same 
revenue at each moment as long as the average tax rate at which premiums are 
deducted is equal to the average tax rate at which benefits are taxed. In a funded 
system, however, the two taxes raise revenue at different points in time. The 
prepayment system collects taxes earliest. Compared with the situation under the 
prepayment system, under the cash-flow system the government in effect provides 
a loan to the private sector, thereby enlarging its financial deficit. At the same time, 
private individuals need to save more under the cash-flow system in order to meet 
future income tax payments on their pension benefits (i.e. to pay back the implicit 
loan extended by the government) while maintaining their after-tax pension benefits. 
Therefore, if private agents anticipate future tax payments, private pension saving 
should in effect replace part of public saving. The substitution of private for public 
saving looks like Ricardian equivalence, even though households do not have to be 
altruistic towards their heirs. The reason is that the future taxes corresponding to the 
higher stock of public debt are not shifted to future generations but are expected to 
be paid by currently living generations during retirement. 
It could be argued that one should attribute part of private saving under the 
cash-flow system to public saving because part of private pension saving 
corresponds to future income taxes on pension benefits. To judge the effect of a 
given budget deficit on the sustainability of fiscal policy, one has to keep in mind 
that high rates of pension saving may widen the financial deficit of the public sector 
but that the government at the same time accumulates an implicit claim on private 
pension funds. The cash-flow tax reduces the income tax base during the transitional 
* Strictly speaking, pensions are taxed on a consumption-tax basis only if benefits are consumed. 
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period when pension funds are built up, for example when the baby boom generation 
participates in the labour force or when private pension schemes are accumulated 
after privatisation. After the pension funds have matured, however, pension benefits 
exceed pension premiums and the tax base is broader, and the primary deficit 
smaller, than under the prepayment method, at least if the economy is dynamically 
efficient, i.e. as long as the rate of return on the capital in the pension fund exceeds 
the growth rate of the economy (see, for example, Abel et al. ( 1  989)). However, the 
cash-flow tax yields the largest financial deficit of the public sector in the steady 
state as long as pension saving remains positive and pension funds therefore grow, 
for example on account of growth in national income. Although the cash-flow tax 
yields the broadest tax base in the steady state, it nevertheless produces the largest 
financial deficit because the additional interest expenses on the larger stock of public 
debt exceed the additional tax revenue. 
Most industrial countries adopt the cash-flow system.3 This implies that the 
governments in these countries have acquired an implicit tax claim on funded 
pension schemes, which can be computed as the product of the average income tax 
rate on pension benefits and the assets of pension funds. These tax claims should be 
taken into account when using data on public debt to compare fiscal sustainability 
across countries. The governments of these countries are less vulnerable to changes 
in interest rates than they appear on the basis of their stocks of public debt. Whereas 
higher interest rates raise the cost of servicing public debt, they also increase the 
return on the implicit tax claim on pension funds. Governments benefit the most if 
pension funds use windfalls to reduce pension premiums because these premiums 
are typically deducted at rather high marginal tax rates. If windfalls are used to 
improve future pension benefits, the government benefits through a higher value of 
the tax claim on the private pension assets. In this case, the cash flow of the 
government improves only in the long run when higher pension benefits yield larger 
tax revenues. 
2. The Interpretation oj’the Data on Tax Claims 
Before presenting the estimates for the tax claims and the adjustments to public debt, 
we emphasise at the outset that our correction to the data on public debt needs to be 
interpreted with caution for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the correction 
performed here singles out only one of a number of possible corrections to regular 
public debt data. Therefore, the data provided here need to be supplemented by more 
information in order to arrive at reliable internationally comparable indicators of 
public wealth. On the tax side, we have considered only the tax claims on account 
of deferred personal income tax. In principle, one could also measure the tax claim 
Sornecountries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium, do not really tax pension saving 
on a consumption-tax basis because they collect tax also on (part of) the returns of pension funds. 
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on capital assets, including those in pension funds, on account of indirect 
consumption taxes, such as excises, environmental levies and VAT. Besides these 
tax claims, other implicit tax claims exist, for example dividend taxes on capital 
accumulated within firms and capital gains taxes on selected capital assets. 
Against these tax claims on the private sector, the private sector holds implicit 
claims on the public sector, in the form of various types of implicit and explicit 
public expenditure commitments. These claims are especially large in ageing 
societies: elaborate welfare states with extensive subsidy schemes (for example, in 
housing and public transport) and social security programmes, and countries with 
large environmental   debt^'.^ The indicators of fiscal sustainability developed by 
the OECD (see, for example, Blanchard et al. (1990)) focus on these public spending 
commitments by estimating future expenditure trends (see also Hagemann and 
Nicoletti (1 989)). 
The distinct risk features of the various implicit or explicit tax and expenditure 
claims need to be recognised. To illustrate, governments typically have much more 
leeway in reducing implicit expenditure commitments associated with subsidy 
schemes than in defaulting on their public debt. In this connection, the implicit tax 
claim on institutional investors has different characteristics from the stock of public 
debt. First, the tax claim depends on the future effective income tax rate on pension 
benefits. For example, the government suffers a windfall loss if it reduces the 
personal income tax rate or if retirees emigrate. Second, the return on the tax claim 
corresponds to that on the assets of the pension funds. This return can differ from 
the return on public debt. In particular, the return on pension funds that invest a large 
share of their capital in equities may well significantly exceed the return on 
government debt. Accordingly, the return on the tax claim of the Governments in 
the United States and the United Kingdom may exceed that of the Dutch Government 
because Dutch pension funds invest a relatively small share of their capital in 
equities. 
3. Estimating Tax Claims on Pension Funds 
Table 2 contains data on the assets of private and public pension funds in several 
countries? It appears that the size of funded pension schemes (relative to GDP) 
When the population ages, large funded supplementary pension schemes benefit the public finances on two 
accounts. First, they yield a broader base for income and consumption taxes. Second, they tend to imply lower 
public spending on pay-as-you-go public pensions. High private pensions are also likely to reduce the demand for 
other types of public spending, such as health and social security spending. 
The public sector bears a substantial share of the costs of environmental damage because ‘the polluter pays’ 
principle cannot be applied in all circumstances. 
’ Methods for the valuation of assets in pension funds differ across countries, in part due to differences in regulatory 
regimes. These differences complicate an international comparison of the size of pension funds and life assurance 
companies. In particular, the assets in pension and life assurance funds in countries that adopt conservativevaluation 
methods may be underestimated. 
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differs substantially across countries. Funded pension schemes play a major role in 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, the pension 
assets in these countries show considerable growth. Pension funds are not well 
developed in Germany, in part because the tax treatment of contributions to pension 
funds is less favourable than in other countries. However, employers' contributions 
to book reserves are not taxed. Hence, companies in Germany (and also in Austria) 
rely heavily on book reserves as these reserves constitute a cheap form of financing. 
In France, pension funds are small because pay-as-you-go schemes provide the bulk 
of pension provisions. 
TABLE 2 
Public Debt, Pension Funds and Life Insurance Reserves 
in Selected OECD Countries, 1984 and 1989 
Percentage ofGDP 
Supplementary Life Gross Tar claim Tax claim Public debt 
pension insurance public on pension on life adjusted 
,fundf reserves debt fundsb insurance for tax 
reserve& claims b 
1984 
United States 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France 
I989 
United States 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France 1 
32 16 46 6 3 36 
12 14 68 2 3 63 
40 n.a. 55 8 n.a. n.a. 
62 19 66 12 4 50 
5 22" 42 0 5 37 
2 2 44 0 0 43 
46 16 
19 25 
58 49 
81 26 
6 26" 
2 9 
54 9 3 
69 4 5 
39 12 10 
81 16 5 
43 0 5 
47 0 2 
42 
60 
17 
59 
38 
45 
a Includes funds in both the public and the private sector. 
paid by German pension funds) is 20 per cent. 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, December 1990; OECD Financial Accounts, Part 2; Intersec 
Research Corp., 1990. 
Based on the hypothesis that the average tax rate on supplementary pension benefits (except those 
Includes book reserves in non-financial corporations. 
Table 2 adjusts the public debt figures for the tax claim on funded pension 
schemes. The calculation is based on the assumption that all countries tax 
supplementary pensions at an effective rate of, on average, 20 per cent. Clearly this 
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is a very crude assumption because the respective countries differ with respect to 
tax exemptions for pension benefits, tax rates and so on. Therefore, the tax rate of 
20 per cent is only a working hypothesis to gain a first impression about the order 
of magnitude of the implicit tax claims. Further research on the effective income tax 
rates in the various countries is desirable. The effective rate should be based on 
expectations concerning future average tax rates on pension benefits. It is also 
affected by the share of private pension benefits that escapes domestic tax because 
the pension benefits are paid out to retirees residing abroad. 
Our estimates suggest that the four countries with the highest public debt in 1984 
featured the highest tax claim on funded pension benefits. The already low public 
debt figure of the United Kingdom in 1989 becomes by far the lowest after the 
correction for the tax claim. Although the Netherlands experienced the most 
substantial increase in the tax claim (as a percentage of GDP) between 1984 and 
1989, this country still shows the largest growth of the adjusted public debt figures. 
Table 2 also presents the assets of life assurance companies. A tax claim rests on 
these assets too, because governments tax a substantial share of the benefits that are 
paid out of these assets, The United Kingdom and the Netherlands - the countries 
with the largest ratios of pension funds to GDP - also feature substantial life 
assurance assets. 
In order to derive a tentative estimate for the fiscal claim on life assurance 
companies, Table 2 further corrects the public debt figures for the tax claim on life 
assurance assets. It adopts the assumption that the effective tax claim on future life 
assurance benefits is also 20 per cent. Clearly, also this is a very crude estimate for 
the expected future tax rates in different countries. Compared with the tax rate on 
benefits from pension funds, the tax rate on benefits from life assurance companies 
may be lower because a smaller share of life assurance contributions benefits from 
a cash-flow tax treatment. However, life assurance benefits tend to accrue to 
higher-income retirees, which raises the effective tax rate. 
Table 3 combines the results of the adjustments performed in Tables 1 and 2 to 
arrive at internationally comparable data on public debt that account for both the 
funding of public pensions and the tax claim on institutional investors. The 
difference between the regular and adjusted public debt figures turns out to be largest 
for the Netherlands, namely almost 50 per cent of GDP. The corrections for Germany 
and France appear relatively small. 
IV. TWO CONSUMPTION TAX TREATMENTS OF PENSION SAVING 
This section examines various considerations that play a role in choosing between 
the two alternative consumption tax treatments of pensions, namely the cash-flow 
and prepayment systems. These considerations may be especially relevant for 
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TABLE 3 
Adjustments of Gross Public Debt (PD) for Pension Assets of 
Public Employees (PPA), Social Security Assets (SSA), Tax 
Claim on Assets of Private Pensions (FCP) and Tax Claim on 
Life Insurance Companies (FCA) in Selected OECD Countries, 1989 
Percentage of GDP 
FCP PPAa FCA SSA Adjusted P D  I pD 
United States 
Japan 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France 
54 9 14 3 3 25 
69 4 10 5 18 32 
39 12 14 10 0 3 
81 16 27 5 0 33 
43 0 0 5 0 38 
47 0 0 2 0 45 
a Adjusted for tax claim, which is included in FCP. 
Source: Tables 1 and 2. 
Eastern European economies that are setting up funded private pension schemes. 
They are also relevant for countries that are considering changing the tax treatment 
of pension saving.7 
I .  Intertemporal Tax Arbitrage 
Under the cash-flow tax, individuals can arbitrage across different (expected) tax 
rates during their lifetimes. This can be important because marginal tax rates during 
the working life often exceed (expected) marginal tax rates during retirement, as 
marginal personal income tax rates tend to increase with income. Social security 
taxes may strengthen this effect. While pension benefits typically are not liable to 
social security taxes, pension premiums are generally not included in the base for 
social security taxes. Accordingly, by postponing their consumption until retirement 
through pension saving, households can take advantage of lower tax rates during 
retirement. In fact, the effective tax rate on the return on pension saving is negative 
and pension saving is subsidised if marginal tax rates when working exceed the 
corresponding rates when retired.8 Under the prepayment method, in contrast, 
’ By levying a one-off wealth tax on pension funds, countries with mature pension systems can alleviate the 
transitional problems associated with moving from the cash-flow to the prepayment system. 
* In examining the incentives to shift consumption through pension saving, one may also have to explore how 
effective marginal tax rates during the working life and retirement period are affected by income-dependent prices 
and public transfers or own contributions that depend on income. There are also tax arbitrage opportunities if 
individuals expect the government to reduce the income tax rate or the tax rates on consumption (such as VAT) 
before or during their retirement. 
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households cannot arbitrage across the different marginal rates, and the effective tax 
rate on the return is always zero. 
The intertemporal tax arbitrage under the cash-flow system distorts the 
intertemporal allocation of consumption by providing an artificial incentive to shift 
consumption to periods when tax rates are expected to be low and saving to periods 
with high tax rates. The cash-flow treatment, however, allows individuals who earn 
their income mainly at the beginning of their life to spread their taxable income more 
evenly over their whole lifetime. This yields a more equitable tax system if one 
considers lifetime income to be a more equitable tax base than annual income as 
marginal tax rates are based on lifetime rather than annual income (see, for example, 
Kay ( 1990)). 
2 .  International Tax Arbitrage 
In contrast to the prepayment method, the cash-flow system allows tax arbitrage 
across tax rates in different countries. In particular, workers in high-tax countries 
can benefit from low personal tax rates in foreign countries by retiring abroad. In 
fact, retirees may establish residence in countries with low tax rates but may continue 
to benefit from high public spending in high-tax countries as they spend most of 
their time in these latter countries. These arbitrage activities harm high-tax countries 
and may result in downward pressure on income tax rates as the international 
mobility of retirees increases in particular regions, such as the European 
Community. They may also put pressure on countries to hannonise their tax 
structures. To illustrate, if some countries rely primarily on labour taxes while others 
adopt mainly consumption taxes, agents may arbitrage across these tax systems by 
working in the consumption-tax country and retiring to the country that relies on 
labour taxes. EC countries may also want to anticipate the growing mobility of 
labour by moving toward ‘benefit’ taxes, which establish a closer link between taxes 
paid and public benefits received. 
3. Risk Features 
Under the cash-flow tax, the government in effect buys a share in the pension funds. 
Accordingly, the government shares in the investment risk of the pension funds 
because the average rate of return on the government’s share equals the average rate 
of return on the investments of the pension fund. Under the prepayment version of 
the consumption tax, in contrast, the government has a lower stock of public debt 
and, therefore, earns a return equal to that on government bonds. In countries where 
the return on pension funds exceeds that on government bonds, therefore, the 
prepayment method yields less discounted tax revenue - at least if the tax rate 
during retirement does not differ from that during the working period. In effect, the 
cash-flow tax levies a tax on rents (that is, the ‘interest’ premium earned by pension 
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funds). Accordingly, the government may find a cash-flow tax more attractive than 
the prepayment method if it has confidence in the investment policy of the pension 
funds and at the same time expects to be able to borrow at low rates. If the pension 
funds invest in government paper, however, the government in effect invests in itself 
under a cash-flow tax. Under these circumstances, the prepayment system may save 
on transaction costs. In this connection, the prepayment system may be interpreted 
as interfering with the free international movement of capital because the 
government in effect forces pension funds to invest in government paper. 
Furthermore, the cash-flow system may enhance the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to sound fiscal policies because the government is more vulnerable to 
changes in the risk premium on its debt instruments. 
4 .  Impegect Capital Markets 
Compared with the situation under the prepayment system, under the cash-flow 
system the government in effect provides a loan to the private sector. This may 
enhance welfare if the government can borrow at lower rates than the private sector. 
By relieving liquidity constraints, the cash-flow tax may also yield lower national 
saving compared with the prepayment system. The reason for this is that private 
saving will not rise sufficiently to offset the rising financial deficit of the public 
sector.9 Indeed, the cash flow of the government becomes a better indicator of fiscal 
policy if households face liquidity constraints. The analysis of Hubbard and Judd 
( 1  986) suggests that liquidity constraints may exert a powerful impact on the effects 
of policy on private consumption. 
5.  Imperfect Political Process and Budget Discipline 
The cash-flow tax forces the government to borrow more on capital markets. The 
resulting higher stock of public debt may strengthen budget discipline when pension 
funds are being built up. This may benefit future generations: larger revenues from 
a broader tax base are not offset by higher interest spending on a larger stock of 
public debt. In an ageing society, the cash-flow tax has the advantage that a broader 
tax base coincides with large expenditure needs. 
Whether the cash-flow tax produces higher natmal saving than the prepayment 
system depends on the relative importance of ‘imperfections’ in the private and 
public sectors. If private capital markets function perfectly and households do not 
face liquidity constraints and anticipate future taxes but the government fails to take 
This illustrates that tax incentives for private saving that defer taxes may not be successful in raising national 
saving. This is especially so if the combination of these tax incentives with the deductibility of mortgage interest 
provides opportunities for tax arbitrage. See also Stiglitz (1985). National saving may also fall if households feature 
short time horizons so that they heavily discount future tax payments on retirement benefits. 
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into account its claim on private pension funds or suffers from constraints on its 
borrowing, the cash-flow tax is likely to yield the highest level of national saving. 
However, if the government incorporates this claim in its decision-making but the 
private sector features short horizons or faces liquidity constraints, the prepayment 
method may well produce the highest national saving. 
In this connection, the government may face difficulties in borrowing large 
amounts because of fears that the government will inflate its nominal debt away, 
This will be especially so if pension and life assurance funds are well hedged against 
inflation. In that case, unanticipated inflation will improve public wealth as the 
erosion of nominal public debt exceeds the decline in the real value of the fiscal 
claim on pension funds. If the government faces these credibility constraints, it may 
want to change the composition of its assets and liabilities by opting for the 
prepayment system as a device to increase the credibility of its anti-inflation 
commitment. 
6. Changes in Tax Rates and Windfall Gains and Losses 
During the period when pension funds are built up, a cash-flow tax yields a smaller 
income tax base than the prepayment system does. After the pension funds have 
matured, however, the income tax base is broader (see Section 111). The government 
benefits from this if personal income tax rates are rising over time.'O In that case, 
pension benefits are taxed at higher rates than those at which the premiums 
corresponding to these benefits have been deducted. Intuitively, the government 
expropriates part of the pension funds, if it raises personal income tax rates on 
pension benefits. Accordingly, the public sector benefits from a windfall gain at the 
expense of those who receive pension benefits.' Similarly, the government suffers 
a windfall loss if it reduces personal income tax rates on pension benefits. The 
government can avoid this windfall loss by levying a one-off wealth tax on pension 
funds. 
7. Insurance against Unexpected Shocks with a Broader Tax Base 
A cash-flow tax seems to provide better insurance against unexpected shocks in an 
ageing society with mature pension funds because the government has a broader tax 
base at its disposal. Under a prepayment system, pension premiums are included in 
the tax base. Under the alternative cash-flow version, however, it is pension benefits 
that are taxed. In a mature pension fund, benefits exceed premiums -especially in 
'"Unless falling indirect consumption tax rates accompany rising personal income taxes. 
I '  An unexpected increase in indirect consumption taxes amounts to the expropriation of apart of all assets, including 
non-pension assets. See  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
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an ageing society.12 Hence, compared with the prepayment system, the cash-flow 
tax yields a broader tax base, and smaller changes in tax rate are required to collect 
a given amount of tax revenue. This may reduce the deadweight losses and 
uncertainties associated with the tax system. 
8. Stabilisation Aspects 
The two systems differ in how changes in interest rates are transmitted to the 
economy. Compared with the situation under the prepayment system, rising interest 
rates produce a larger improvement in the short-run cash flow of the pension funds 
and a larger deterioration of the cash flow of the public sector13 under the cash-flow 
tax. The short-run effect on aggregate demand depends on the saving ratios of the 
pension funds and the public sector. If the pension funds feature a high saving ratio 
and if the public and private sectors operate under cash-flow constraints,14 rising 
interest rates are likely to depress aggregate dernand the most under the cash-flow 
tax. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has contributed to the development of indicators measuring the 
intertemporal impact of fiscal policy. It has illustrated that conventional data on 
public debt and public deficits need to be supplemented by information on the 
structure of the tax and expenditure systems in order to correctly assess the 
sustainability of fiscal policy and the effect of fiscal policy on intergenerational 
equity. This supplementary information is especially important in economies that 
are in transition. Moreover, as financial liberalisation proceeds and markets develop, 
measures of fiscal policy that take account of the microeconomic aspects of the 
structure of the tax and expenditure systems gain in importance. 
This paper has focused on how data on public debt and public wealth are affected 
both by the financing arrangements for social security pensions and supplementary 
pensions of public employees and by the interaction of the tax treatment of pension 
saving and the importance of pension and life assurance funds in the private sector. 
In particular, governments that establish funds to meet their pension obligations may 
be in a better financial position than those that rely on pay-as-you-go systems. 
Furthermore, governments in countries that combine high levels of pension saving 
with high income and consumption tax rates accumulate assets of an implicit kind, 
namely a tax claim on pension assets. While public debt may rise as the cash-flow 
measure of the public deficit records substantial deficits, public wealth may 
'*In fact, pension benefits (consumption) exceeding pension premiums (saving) is a condition for the dynamic 
efficiency of funded schemes. See, e.g., Abel et al. (1989). 
"Assuming that the public sector is a net debtor. 
This will be the case if the government has set targets for its financial balance. 14 
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nevertheless increase. Although more research is required, the empirical estimates 
presented in this paper suggest that the assets in public pension funds as well as the 
implicit tax claims on pension assets may be quite large relative to the level of public 
debt. Moreover, changes in these assets may importantly affect conventional 
measures of public deficits. 
Developing indicators that measure changes in these public assets may help to 
identify unsustainable policies that erode public wealth, for example by reducing 
implicit tax claims. These considerations are especially important in evaluating tax 
reforms. For example, by substituting a wage tax for a sales tax, the government 
reduces its implicit tax claim on private assets. This has important implications for 
governments that are considering changing the tax treatment of pensions from the 
cash-flow to the prepayment system. Such a tax reform would be expansionary in 
the short run if it were revenue-neutral, as the currently living generations would 
gain at the expense of future generations. To avoid this, the government must 
accompany this tax reform by the retirement of public debt. 
This paper has also examined several considerations that are relevant in deciding 
how to tax pension saving. The discussion suggested that the cash-flow tax is likely 
to require international co-ordination to avoid tax arbitrage across tax rates in 
different countries as retirees become more mobile internationally. Moreover, to 
prevent financial liberalisation from undermining the income tax through tax 
arbitrage between pension saving and other types of saving, countries may also have 
to co-operate to effectively tax capital income on pension saving. 
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